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Abstract
Research indicates that marriage has a large effect on reducing the risk of poverty and is
associated with a higher probability of attaining affluence over the life course when compared
with nonmarriage. Using data from the American Dream Demonstration (N = 2,364), this study
compares savings performances of married and unmarried low income participants in a matched
savings program – Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). The results indicate that both
married and unmarried low income participants can save in IDA programs; however, unmarried
participants are saving less than married participants. We further examine possible factors that
are associated with savings performance for these two groups. Implications for policy makers
and program administrators to better address the needs of unmarried participants are given.

Marriage has a large effect on reducing the risk of poverty. A number of studies have indicated
that unmarried individuals and single-parent families are more likely to live in poverty than their
married counterparts (Blank, 1997; Furstenberg, 1990; Garfinkel & McLanahan, 1986; U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 2001; White & Rogers, 2000). Compared to married couples, unmarried
people also save much lower portions of their income and accumulate fewer assets. For
example, several studies have indicated that married-couple households have significantly higher
wealth than other types of households (Waite, 1995; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002) and that marriage
is associated with a higher probability of attaining affluence over the life course when compared
with nonmarriage (Hirschl, Altobelli, & Rank, 2003). The limited accumulation of assets in
single-parent families has been increasingly recognized as an important contributing factor to the
high poverty rate within this family type. Lack of assets contributes not only to the low
economic status of single-parent families but, maybe more important, restricts their economic
mobility (Cho, 1999; Rocha, 1997; Sherraden, 1991).
In the last decade, the importance of assets and wealth accumulation as a development strategy is
gaining ground in both academic and policy settings (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Shapiro & Wolff,
2001; Sherraden, 1991). Theory and evidence indicate that accumulation of assets can promote
economic and social development of individuals and families, which include personal wellbeing, economic security, family stability, and civic behavior (Scanlon & Page-Adams, 2001;
Sherraden, 1991). Recently, a wide variety of public policies have been developed to promote
assets ownership among low-income families. One such policy is the Individual Development
Accounts (IDAs). IDAs are saving programs targeted to low-income people and provide
incentives and an institutional structure for saving. Account holders receive matching funds as
they save for assets that promote long-term well-being and financial self-sufficiency such as a
home, post-secondary education, or microenterprise (Sherraden, 1988,1991).
In order to design programs that facilitate savings and asset accumulation for unmarried
individuals and single-parent families, it is necessary to examine whether unmarried people can
save and under what circumstances. The purpose of this study is to examine and compare
savings performance and related factors of married and unmarried participants in IDA programs.
We begin by reviewing theoretical frameworks of saving and empirical evidence on the
relationship between marital status and saving. After the description of characteristics of IDA
participants and bivariate analyses on savings of married and unmarried participants, regression
analyses are conducted to examine how different factors are related to savings of married and
unmarried people in IDAs. Finally, policy and practice implications are discussed.
Theoretical Frameworks of Savings
Economic theories of saving
The two mainstream economic theories of saving are the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani &
Ando, 1957; Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954) and permanent-income hypothesis (Friedman,
1957). The life-cycle hypothesis assumes that consumption is primarily a function of long-term
income, and consumption and saving will represent an individual's age or stage in the life cycle.
The permanent-income hypothesis emphasizes that people constantly face random and temporary
changes in their income. Household consumption and savings reflect, in part, the differences of
the relative share of long-term average income (permanent income) and transitory income.
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Further, the individuals’ consumption habits may change only when people are experiencing
changes in their permanent income. Both of these theories imply that income is a major
determinant of savings (Deaton, 1992). This theoretical summary borrows from Beverly and
Sherraden (1999).
From an economic perspective, marriage has several characteristics that may enhance wealth
accumulation (Becker, 1981; Lupton & Smith, 2003; Schoeni, 1995; Waite, 1995; Waite &
Gallagher, 2000; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002). First, the total product of a married couple is larger
than the sum of the outputs of each produced separately. Second, the institution of marriage
involves long-term commitment in which a division of labor enables each spouse to specialize in
specific skills and duties. This specialization increases the productivity and the efficiency of the
household. Third, economies of scale in consumption suggest that a married couple may achieve
the same utility with less combined expenditure than the sum of their individual consumption if
living apart. Fourth, the requirements and expectations of married (versus single) life may
encourage people to buy a house, save for children’s education, and acquire cars and other assets.
Fifth, there is persistent evidence that married men earn more than unmarried men. Sixth, the
institution of marriage expands one’s social network and social support, which may result in
additional opportunities and benefits that lead to saving. Finally, married individuals may have
access to many benefits such as health and life insurance provided by the spouse’s employment.
Institutional theory of saving
One of the drawbacks of the economic theories of saving is that they are biased toward higher
income groups (Beverly, 1997). The institutional model of saving posits that institutional factors
other than income and preferences may play an important role in promoting savings (Beverly &
Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003). A fundamental
difference between this perspective and the traditional neoclassical economic theory is in the
way savings are being generated. While the traditional economic theory views saving as a result
of individual choices, this theory suggests that savings occur in households largely through
institutional arrangements. Asset accumulation is structured and often subsidized through
institutional arrangements. In the majority of households, unstructured savings, which are left
over from income minus consumption, are likely to be smaller than asset accumulation generated
by institutional arrangements.
Specifically, Beverly and Sherraden (1999) propose four institutional determinants of savings:
institutionalized saving mechanisms (access), targeted financial education, attractive saving
incentives (e.g., matched savings), and facilitation (e.g., payroll deduction). These four were
originally specified by Sherraden, (1999) in the Center for Social Development web pages under
“Key Questions in Asset Building Research.” Sherraden, Schreiner and Beverly (2003) further
suggest that specific savings expectations and the relaxation of savings limits and restrictions can
help people save. From this viewpoint, a major reason that low-income households save less is
that they lack the access to incentives or institutions that promote and subsidize asset
accumulation (Howard, 1997; Seidman, 2001; Sherraden, 1991, 2001). For example, the nonpoor can save for retirement through institutionalized mechanisms with tax benefits; the poor, on
the other hand, are much less likely to have jobs with pension benefits, thus their savings
opportunities for retirement are more limited.
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Although further empirical evidence is needed, results of a number of studies support the
propositions of the institutional view of savings. For example, the role that access plays in
promoting saving can be shown in statistical evidence of the inequality in pension coverage and
accumulation rates (Orszag & Greenstein, 2000). In terms of financial education, studies find
that employee-based financial education increases both participation rates and amount of
contribution in retirement plans (Bayer, Bernheim, & Scholz, 1996; Bernheim & Garrett, 1996).
Financial education programs also significantly improve financial behaviors of low-income
populations (Caskey, 2001). In addition, Anderson, (1998) suggests that lack of knowledge is
one of the reasons for the underutilization of public financial services and benefits by the poor.
In support of the institutional perspective of savings, studies also find that individuals save less
due to assets restrictions or limits. For example, researchers have documented that the assets
limits associated with means-tested welfare programs negatively influence savings of
participants and potential participants (Carney & Gale, 2001; Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1994,
1995; Hurst & Ziliak, 2001; Powers, 1998; Ziliak, 1999). Governments in many nations provide
tax incentives for private pensions to encourage saving, which reflects the belief that in the
absence of these incentives, individuals would not initiate and sustain sufficient savings for
retirement (Orszag & Greenstein, 2000).
Evidence on Marriage and Wealth Accumulation
A number of studies have indicated that marriage may have a variety of positive effects on the
well-being of individuals and families, controlling for other demographic and socioeconomic
factors. These effects include better financial well-being, better health, longer life, higher
achievement of children, and higher earnings for married men (see a review by Waite, 1995;
Waite & Gallagher, 2000). A recent study by Hirschl, Altobelli, and Rank (2003) further
indicates that marriage enhanced the lifetime probability of affluence, and Whites and women
were more likely to benefit from marriage compared to Blacks and men.
Studies that examine the impact of marital status on savings and family wealth consistently
suggest that marriage can enhance wealth accumulation (Hao, 1996; Lupton & Smith, 2003;
Seigel, 1993). For example, through the analysis of data from the Health and Retirement Survey
and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Lupton and Smith (2003) find that married couples
save significantly more than other household types, an effect not fully explained by their higher
incomes nor the simple aggregation of two individuals’ wealth. Similarly, Seigel (1993) reports
that currently married older couples have higher median incomes and net worth than older adults
who were widowed, divorced, or never married. The study by Hao (1996) also indicates that
married families have greater wealth than other types of families, and marriage reinforces the
promoting effect of transfers on wealth.
Some of these studies also examine the impact of marital history on wealth accumulation. For
example, several studies find that individuals who remain married throughout the life course
have significantly higher wealth than those who are not continuously married, and divorce in
particular has negative impact on wealth accumulation (Holden & Kuo, 1996; Wilmoth & Koso,
2002). Remarriage offsets the negative effects of a marital dissolution (Wilmoth & Koso, 2002).
A number of marriages also has a negative effect on family wealth (Hao, 1996).
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One of the limitations of the above studies on the impact of marriage on wealth is that they do
not examine possible different factors that may be associated with savings and wealth
accumulation of people with different marital status. Another limitation is that current research
has not paid much attention to the impact of marital status on savings among the low-income
population. Further, previous research has not examined how married and unmarried people
save in structured savings programs. Research on these issues may help understand special
needs of unmarried low-income people and how they respond to institutional factors designed to
stimulate savings.
As mentioned, the purpose of this study is to examine and compare the experiences of married
and unmarried participants in IDAs. As the first quantitative assessment of the savings patterns
of married and unmarried low-income populations in a structured savings program, the following
questions are addressed: (a) Is there a difference in savings outcomes between married and
unmarried participants in IDAs? (b) What are the specific predictors that explain savings
outcomes among these two groups? (c) What are the policy implications for supporting asset
building for these two groups?
Methods
Data and sample
The data come from the “American Dream Policy Demonstration” (ADD), the first large-scale
test of IDAs, designed to study the merits of IDAs as a community development and public
policy tool (Sherraden et al., 2000). Beginning in 1997, ADD research followed more than 2,000
participants at 14 community-based program sites across the United States for four years (19972001), with research planned through 2005. ADD has a multi-method research design to gather
information on many aspects of IDA programs and participants in order to inform assets-based
policy outside of ADD. IDA programs in ADD are operating in community-based organizations
that are working together with financial institutions. In most cases, participants in ADD are at or
below 200% of the federal income-poverty guidelines, and the median participants is at about
100% of the income-poverty guideline. IDA savings are used for specific purposes, usually
home purchase, post-secondary education, and microenterprise.
The data set used in this study is from monitoring all savings transactions. Program staff
collected both programs’ and participants’ data with the Management Information System for
Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA). Savings data are from financial institutions and
thus are highly accurate. This may be the best available data set on savings patterns among low
income families (Sherraden, 2002).
Measures
Participants in this analysis include all enrollees, including those who have dropped out of the
program without a matched withdrawal. Savings and asset accumulation consist of different
elements (Schreiner et al., 2001). Therefore, two dependent variables are being used in order to
measure savings in IDA programs, trying to capture the two major aspects of savings: the
savings amount and the regularity of the saving. These variables include the average monthly

4

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

net deposit (AMND) and the deposit frequency. These variables were constructed and used in
previous reports on ADD programs.
Average monthly net deposit (AMND) is defined as net deposits per month and is calculated as
deposit plus interest minus unmatched withdrawals, divided by the number of months of
participation. Thus, AMND controls for the length of participation in the program. AMND is a
key measure of savings outcomes in this study because greater AMND implies greater savings
and assets accumulation.
Deposit frequency is defined as the number of months with a deposit divided by the number of
months of participation. It shows how regularly a participant saves through time.
The independent variables used include a wide range of participant demographic, financial, and
program characteristics. Specifically the following individual variables are included: gender,
age, residency, household size, number of dependents, race, education, employment status,
receipt of public assistance, total income, income poverty ratio, ownership of checking account,
ownership of savings account, car and homeownership. In addition the following institutional
characteristics are included: direct deposit, hours of financial education, match rate, and
program dummies.
Theoretical Framework
Institutional Characteristics
* Direct Deposit

* Match Rate

* Financial Education * Program Dummies
Individual Characteristics

IDA
Savings

* Gender

* Age

* Race/ethnicity

* Education

* Employment

* Number of Dependents

* Residency

* Household Size

* Public Assistance Use

* Total Income

* Income Poverty Ratio

* Ownership of Checking Account

* Home Ownership

* Ownership of Savings Account

Outcomes

* Car Ownership

Analysis
The effect of marital status on saving outcomes is examined using one-tailed t-tests and OLS
regression models. The purposes of the analysis are twofold. First, we want to investigate
whether there is a difference in saving outcomes between married and unmarried participants in
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IDA programs. Based on previous research, we hypothesize that married participants have
higher IDA savings and deposit more frequently than unmarried participants. The second
purpose of the analysis is to determine if different predictors are associated with saving
performance of the married and unmarried groups.
Descriptive statistics are first generated to compare the individual characteristics of the two
groups (married vs. unmarried). Next, in order to test differences in saving outcomes between
married and unmarried IDA participants, two one-tailed t-tests for independent groups are
performed. The first t-test looks at the difference in AMND between married and unmarried
participants, and the second t- test looks at the difference in deposit frequency.
Then, with the aim of exploring the unique predictors of saving outcomes among married and
unmarried participants in IDA programs, four separate regression models are executed. The first
model has AMND as the dependent variable and is executed with only married participants, and
the second model has AMND as the dependent variable and is executed with only unmarried
participants. The third and fourth models use deposit frequency as the dependent variable and
are executed with only married participants and only unmarried participants.
Results
Table 1 shows characteristics of married and unmarried IDA participants. Compared to
unmarried participants, married participants have higher levels of full time employment (67% vs.
56%) and part time employment (24% vs. 19%). Married participants also have higher levels of
homeownership (30% vs. 12%) and car ownership (81% vs. 60%) and are less likely to be on
public assistance currently (3% vs. 12 %) or in the past (21% vs. 43%). In addition, married
participants are more likely to have a checking account (70% vs. 63%). However, married and
unmarried participants have similar rates of having a savings account (49% vs. 51%) and similar
patterns of educational attainment. Married participants in ADD are less likely to be female
(55% vs. 86%) and non-White (50% vs. 66%) and have fewer dependents. Overall, these
descriptive characteristics suggest that unmarried participants in ADD are somewhat more
demographically disadvantaged than married participants in ADD.
Table 1. Participants Characteristics of Married and Unmarried IDA participants
Variables

Married (n=1,831)

Unmarried (n=509)

Mean (std.dev.)

Mean (std.dev.)

Age

36.2 (9.4)

35.5 (10.5)

Number of dependents

2.1 (0.8)

2.4 (1.3)

Household size

4.4 (1.6)

2.9 (1.5)

Continues variables

(table continues)
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Table 1. (continued)
Variables

Married (n=1,831)

Unmarried (n=509)

Percent

Percent

55

86

18

12

Caucasian

50

34

African American

26

52

Asian American or Pacific Islander

3

1

Latino or Hispanic

15

7

Native American

3

2

Other ethnicity

3

2

Did not completed high school

15

16

Completed high school or GED

28

25

Attended college

34

38

Completed 2-year degree

3

4

Graduated from college

11

11

Completed 4-year degree or more

9

7

Employed full-time

67

56

Employed part-time

24

19

Not working

6

4

Unemployed

3

6

Student, not working

3

7

Student, also working

1

3

Categorical variables
Gender
Female
Residency
Rural
Race/ Ethnicity

Education

Employment

(table continues)
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Table 1. (continued)
Variables

Married (n=1,831)

Unmarried (n=509)

Percent

Percent

Currently on TANF

3

12

Formally on TANF

21

43

Home ownership

30

12

Car ownership

81

60

Ownership of checking account

70

63

Ownership of saving account

49

51

Categorical variables
Receipt of public assistance

Asset ownership

Banking experience

Marital status and AMND
Results of the t-test indicate that the difference in AMND between married ($24) and unmarried
($18) participants is significant [t = 4.83, p = 0.00]. In order to examine how different factors
are related to savings for married and non–married participants, an additional two regressions are
executed. The first regression model is with only married participants and the second regression
model is with only unmarried participants. Results from these two individual regressions
indicate that race, hours of financial education, and match rate are associated with AMND for
both the married and unmarried groups. However, while these three independent variables are
the only predictors of AMND among the married group, several additional variables are
associated with AMND for the unmarried group. These variables include level of education,
household size, residency (living in a rural vs. urban area), number of dependents, ownership of
a checking account, car ownership and home ownership.
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Table 2. OLS Models Predicating the Effects of Individual and Institutional Variables on
AMND for Married and Unmarried Participants
Unmarried
Independent Variables

Married

Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients

p-value

Financial education

0.62

0.00

1.06

0.00

Direct deposit

4.55

0.04

4.54

0.41

1:1

-5.56

0.06

-8.05

0.22

2:1

-9.36

0.00

-14.71

0.03

3:1

-4.02

0.25

-9.41

0.57

0.49

0.76

0.87

0.78

Less than 40 years

0.11

0.20

0.18

0.52

40 years or more

0.02

0.84

-0.10

0.75

-4.71

0.05

3.89

0.53

Household size

1.35

0.02

-2.73

0.26

Number of dependents

-1.49

0.02

1.15

0.79

Match rate

(4:1 to 7:1)
Gender
Female
(Male)
Age

Residency
Rural
(Urban)
Household composition

(table continues)
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Table 2. (continued)
Unmarried
Independent Variables

Married

Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients

p-value

African American

-3.64

0.01

-1.35

0.74

Asian American or Pacific Islander

7.33

0.08

18.74

0.01

Latino or Hispanic

2.89

0.23

-0.31

0.95

Native American

-6.71

0.05

-2.12

0.78

Other ethnicity

4.92

0.12

-2.62

0.80

Completed 2-year degree

0.12

0.97

2.35

0.78

Graduated from college

4.11

0.07

6.13

0.29

Completed high school or GED

0.48

0.78

6.42

0.16

Completed 4-year degree or more

10.04

0.00

11.27

0.06

Completed high school or GED

1.05

0.55

0.81

0.86

Employed full-time

-0.51

0.83

11.50

0.15

Employed part-time

1.93

0.43

10.67

0.20

Not working

-1.45

0.68

6.39

0.48

Student, not working

5.27

0.09

3.50

0.75

Student, also working

6.05

0.09

25.43

0.07

Formally on TANF

-0.28

0.82

-1.32

0.73

Currently on TANF

-2.30

0.25

5.42

0.54

Race/ Ethnicity

(Caucasian)
Education

(Did not completed high school)
Employment

(Unemployed)
Receipt of public assistance

(table continues)
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Table 2. (continued)
Unmarried
Independent Variables

Married

Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients

p-value

Total income

0.19

0.25

0.44

0.30

Income poverty ratio

-0.24

0.89

-0.84

0.89

Saving account

-0.21

0.85

-0.86

0.77

Checking account

5.41

0.00

2.52

0.43

Car ownership

2.99

0.01

2.59

0.49

Home ownership

10.81

0.00

4.79

0.19

Income

Banking experience

Asset ownership

n

1,561

434

R2

0.27

0.28

Race is significantly related to AMND for both married and unmarried participants. Among
married participants, AMND of Asian Americans is $18.7 higher than that of Caucasians.
Among unmarried participants, when compared to Caucasians, being Native American is
associated with a $6.71 decrease in AMND, and being African American is associated with
$3.64 decrease in AMND.
Hours of financial education attended by participants is also statistically related to AMND in
both models. For married participants each additional hour is associated with an increase in
AMND of $1.06, and for unmarried participants an additional hour is associated with an increase
in AMND of $0.62.
Finally, for both married and unmarried participants, match rate is positively associated with
AMND. Specifically, married participants with a match rate of 2:1 save $15 less compared to
those with a match rate between 4:1 to 7:1, and unmarried participants with a match rate of 2:1
save $9 less when compared to those with a match rate between 4:1 to 7:1.
Several additional variables are associated with unmarried participants only. Among
demographic variables, living in a rural area is associated with $4.71 less in AMND for
unmarried participants compared to living in an urban area. Unmarried IDA participants who
have completed a 4-year college degree have about $10 higher in AMND than unmarried
participants with less than a high school degree. Household size is positively related to savings;
each additional person in the household is associated with $1.35 more in AMND. However, the
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dependency ratio or the number of household members per adult is linked with a decrease in
AMND of $1.49. Families with more dependents may find it harder to save.
Assets ownership such as car ownership, homeownership and having a checking account are all
positive predictors of AMND for unmarried participants. Specifically, car ownership is
associated with approximately $3 more in AMND, homeownership is associated with about $11
more in AMND, and checking account ownership is associated with $5.41 more in AMND.
Owning such assets may suggest that the participant had previous experiences with savings.
Finally, direct deposit is significantly related to AMND. Unmarried participants who had direct
deposit are associated with $4.55 more in AMND than unmarried participants who did not have
direct deposit.
Marital status and deposit frequency
The results of the t-test indicate a significant difference [t = 4.83, p = 0.00] in deposit frequency
between married (0.51) and unmarried (0.47) participants.
The regression results indicate that direct deposit and financial education are associated with the
deposit frequency for both married and unmarried participants. For the unmarried participants,
four additional individual characteristics are also related to deposit frequency: ownership of a
checking account, level of education, residency, and home ownership.
Table 3. OLS Models Predicating the Effects of Individual and Institutional Variables on
Deposit Frequency for Married and Unmarried Participants
Unmarried
Independent Variables

Married

Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients

p-value

Financial education

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.00

Direct deposit

0.22

0.00

0.18

0.00

1:1

-0.04

0.20

-0.02

0.78

2:1

-0.05

0.09

-0.05

0.39

3:1

-0.04

0.27

-0.06

0.67

-0.01

0.63

0.00

0.97

Match rate

(4:1 to 7:1)
Gender
Female
(Male)
(table continues)
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Table 3. (continued)
Unmarried
Independent Variables

Married

Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients

p-value

Less than 40 years

0.00

0.09

0.00

0.84

40 years or more

0.00

0.10

0.00

0.22

-0.08

0.00

0.02

0.67

Household Size

0.00

0.90

-0.02

0.46

Number of Dependents

-0.01

0.29

0.00

0.93

African American

-0.02

0.23

-0.06

0.14

Asian American or Pacific Islander

0.03

0.57

0.03

0.64

Latino or Hispanic

-0.02

0.58

-0.02

0.70

Native American

-0.07

0.09

-0.04

0.56

Other ethnicity

0.01

0.86

0.02

0.82

Completed 2-year degree

-0.01

0.83

0.03

0.69

Graduated from college

0.06

0.02

0.01

0.79

Completed high school or GED

0.01

0.74

0.01

0.82

Completed 4-year degree or more

0.07

0.02

0.00

0.99

Completed high school or GED

0.01

0.55

0.00

0.98

Age

Residency
Rural
(Urban)
Household composition

Race/ Ethnicity

(Caucasian)
Education

(Did not completed high school)
(table continues)
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Table 3. (continued)
Unmarried
Independent Variables

Married

Coefficients

p-value

Coefficients

p-value

Employed full-time

-0.01

0.65

0.04

0.57

Employed part-time

0.01

0.63

0.04

0.55

Not working

-0.04

0.29

-0.01

0.93

Student, not working

-0.01

0.78

-0.03

0.73

Student, also working

0.04

0.38

-0.04

0.77

Formally on TANF

0.02

0.24

-0.02

0.65

Currently on TANF

0.01

0.67

-0.03

0.69

Total income

0.00

0.46

0.00

0.36

Income poverty ratio

0.01

0.57

-0.07

0.18

Saving account

0.02

0.22

0.05

0.06

Checking account

0.05

0.00

0.03

0.27

Car ownership

0.01

0.29

-0.02

0.64

Home ownership

0.08

0.00

0.05

0.16

Employment

(Unemployed)
Receipt of public assistance

Income

Banking experience

Asset ownership

n

1,561

434

R2

0.33

0.34
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Similar to the outcomes on AMND, hours of financial education is positively related to deposit
frequency for both married and unmarried participants. Specifically, each additional hour of
financial education is associated with 1 percentage point increase in deposit frequency.
Direct deposit is also related to deposit frequency for both married and unmarried participants.
Having direct deposit is associated with an increase in deposit frequency of 18 percentage points
and 22 percentage points for married and unmarried participants, respectively.
Several participant characteristics are related to deposit frequency for unmarried participants.
Unmarried IDA participants who graduated from college (with 4-year degrees or with
unspecified degrees) had 7 percentage points higher deposit frequency than those without a high
school degree. Being a resident of a rural area is associated with 8 percentage points lower
deposit frequency than being a resident of an urban area.
Homeownership and having a checking account are predictors of deposit frequency.
Specifically, participants who are homeowners are associated with 8 percentage points higher in
deposit frequency compared with participants who were not homeowners. Checking account
ownership is associated with 5 percentage points higher in deposit frequency.
Discussion
This study examines saving performance of married and unmarried participants in IDAs. The
results indicate that both married and unmarried low income participants can save in IDA
programs; however, unmarried participants are saving smaller amounts than married participants.
It seems that in ADD, unmarried people also have the ability and willingness to save when they
are provided structured opportunities to accumulate assets. Based on these results, policy makers
should not assume that unmarried participants cannot save.
In order to understand the unique experiences of saving among married vs. unmarried IDA
participants, this study further examines possible factors that may be associated with saving
performance for these two groups. Results indicate that for both married and unmarried
participants, financial education and match rates are positively associated with AMND, and
financial education and direct deposit are positively related to deposit frequency. It appears that
institutional factors, not merely individual characteristics, are important in saving performance.
IDA programs require financial education, and this study finds that participants who receive
more hours of financial education save more money and save more frequently. This result is
consistent with other studies reporting that financial management programs can improve
financial knowledge and behaviors of the low-income population (Caskey, 2001; Clancy,
Grinstein-Weiss, & Schreiner, 2001; Jacob, Hudson, & Bush, 2000). The association between
financial education and AMND is stronger for married participants than for unmarried ones.
This may suggest that married and unmarried participants have different knowledge deficiencies.
Further studies on the content of financial education may help specify these differences in the
future.
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Second, an institutional theory of saving suggests that match rate is a possible incentive for the
low-income population to save (Sherraden et al., 2003). Participants in IDAs with match rates of
2:1 saved less than those who had match rates ranging from 4:1 to 7:1. This indicates that higher
match rates may encourage people to save. Similar to the impact of financial education, the
association between match rates and saving is stronger for married participants.
Third, based on an institutional view of saving, direct deposit is a simple and efficient method of
facilitation (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999). In moving money directly from one account to
another, the chance that an individual will use the money for consumption is decreased. Our
study finds that direct deposit is positively associated with AMND for unmarried participants
and with deposit frequency for both groups. These results are congruent with the view that
individuals who receive facilitation that makes saving more manageable and convenient increase
their saving (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999). This is not surprising, but public policy has, to date,
mostly ignored saving facilitation for the poor.
In addition to the above three program factors, race is also a common predictor of savings for
both groups, but its effect is different for married and unmarried participants. After controlling
for other factors, the AMND of married Caucasian participants was lower than married Asian
participants, but not different from other groups. For unmarried groups, African Americans and
Native Americans saved less than their Caucasian counterparts. Unmarried African Americans
and Native Americans may face greater difficulties in attempting to save. This singles out an
important issue in asset-based policy. Further studies that examine race/ethnicity and savings
among unmarried individuals are warranted.
Turning to the factors that are related to saving performance of married and unmarried
participants, several findings are worth mentioning. First, direct deposit is associated with
AMND of unmarried participants only. Unmarried persons may have more barriers (such as
more limited resources) to manage their savings, and strategies to facilitate saving, such as direct
deposit, may matter more for these participants.
Second, regression results indicate that participant characteristics, with the exception of
race/ethnicity, had little impact on savings performance of married participants. For unmarried
participants, however, several additional individual characteristics are associated with savings.
These factors include education, residency, household size, number of dependents, and asset
ownership. It seems that, as research suggests, marriage may provide institutionalized benefits
that facilitate saving (Becker, 1981; Lupton & Smith, 2003; Schoeni, 1995; Waite, 1995; Waite
& Gallagher, 2000; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002). For example, it could be that some married
participants have a spouse that has access to work-related benefits such as child care, and as a
result the number of dependents is not a barrier to making a savings deposit. It is also possible
that car ownership does not matter for married people because the spouse may have a car.
Another explanation may be that the marriage improves expectations and future orientation,
factors that may encourage saving. From ADD data we are unable to say; further research is
needed on these issues.
Some limitations of this study are important to note. First, participants in IDA programs in ADD
are both program-selected, because of eligibility criteria and self-selected, because they
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volunteer to participate in the program (Schreiner et al., 2001). Therefore, ADD participants are
different in some aspects when compared with the U.S. general low-income population.
Therefore, the results generated in this study may not represent how the low income population
outside ADD would perform in IDAs. Second, the assumption in this paper is that deposits in
IDAs come from new savings. However, it may be possible that participants in IDAs are
transferring money from other assets they have (Schreiner et al., 2001). Finally, because we
cannot compare savings performance of ADD participants to non-ADD participants, it is not
possible to attribute saving outcomes to participating in IDAs. An experimental design in ADD
may shed more light on this in the future.
Despite these limitations, this study suggests that both married and unmarried low-income
participants in ADD can save. Therefore, IDAs may be an effective tool to help low-income
people to save and accumulate assets. Therefore, public policies that aim to help low income
individuals save and build assets need to be expanded. Currently, IDA programs only reach a
small portion of low-income people, including unmarried low-income households. In order to
make a significant impact on the lives of low-income people, IDAs and other subsidized saving
programs need to go to scale.
This study found that match rate and financial education positively affected savings. In order to
implement IDA programs more effectively, match rates could be raised for some IDA
participants, and the quality of financial education needs to be ensured. This study also indicates
that additional individual factors were related to the savings of unmarried participants. For
example, unmarried participants living in rural areas and with more children save less. This may
suggest that some unmarried people may have special needs that must be met in order to save
more successfully in IDA programs. Additional strategies may need to be adopted to help these
more disadvantaged groups to save in IDAs.
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